U.S. officer defends key Afghan ally's performance

BAGRAM, Afghanistan -- A senior U.S. Special Forces officer on Monday defended the performance of a key Afghan commander whose forces were driven back during the first day of fighting in Operation Anaconda.

The U.S. officer, who briefed reporters on condition he be referred to only as Lt. Col. Mark, acknowledged that the Afghans were unprepared for the fierce al-Qaida and Taliban resistance they encountered. But he said they performed bravely and eventually managed to take important ground.

The Afghan commander, Zia Lodin, attacked on the first day of the battle with about 400 to 450 men, not expecting to find the large numbers of enemy troops that were in the area, the Special Forces officer said.

"He didn't suffer from a lack of nobility or bravery," the American said. "He suffered from insufficient forces."

The setback at the start of the operation March 2 forced U.S. troops from the 101st Airborne Division and the 10th Mountain Division to undertake a greater combat role than had been foreseen.

The Special Forces officer said the al-Qaida and Taliban may have been tipped off by local villagers who may have seen initial preparations for the attack.

"They certainly had been prepared in this place to defend to a better degree than we expected them to be, and I think that relates to why Zia had a tough time on day one," he said.

Zia's men were beaten back by a barrage of mortar and artillery fire -- losing three men and suffering 30 wounded. An American soldier, Chief Warrant Officer Stanley L. Harriman, 34, was also killed along with Zia's men.

Setback forced change

When asked if the early setback forced a change in the planned role of U.S. troops, Lt. Col. Mark said: "Certainly, to some degree."

According to initial plans, Afghan forces were to conduct the major fighting of the operation, with American soldiers taking up blocking positions to prevent al-Qaida and Taliban fighters from escaping.

But as it became apparent the size of the enemy force was much larger than the 100 or 200 first estimated, U.S. soldiers became the lead combat element.

Eight U.S. soldiers were killed, all in the first two days of the fighting.

An Afghan commander, Isatullah, blamed the intelligence confusion on Zia and his men, saying they were unfamiliar with the area because they came from a different province.

Isatullah also criticized the Americans for relying so heavily on outsiders for their information about enemy strength.

Pool reports from the Shah-e-Kot Valley quoted American soldiers as saying Zia and his men never showed up to take over from them after the first few days, as had also been planned.

But Lt. Col. Mark defended Zia, saying that after the initial retreat, Zia and his men returned on day three of the fighting to retake an important position northwest of the main target area.

Several days later, Zia took another strategic location, greatly contributing to the success of the battle.

"He got knocked down, and then he got back up and then he came back again, into the same place where he lost about 10 percent of his people (as wounded), and then he did it a third time, and he's not done," Lt. Col. Mark said.