Judge acquits Ressel of leaving-scene charge in Poplar Bluff girl's death

CARUTHERSVILLE, Mo. — A Pemiscot County judge granted part of a defense motion Monday morning by acquitting a former Poplar Bluff, Missouri, businessman of a leaving-the-scene charge in connection with a hit-and-run accident that killed a local teenager.

Presiding Circuit Judge Fred Copeland also “tentatively denied” the issuance of a judgment of acquittal for Benjamin J. Ressel about a tampering-with-evidence charge. Copeland could reconsider the charge.

Ressel, 40, had been indicted by a Butler County grand jury in February on the two Class D felonies related to his alleged role in the Dec. 9, 2015, death of Heavenly Grace Hafford.

The 13-year-old died after being struck by a vehicle as she crossed Kanell Boulevard near the Maud Street intersection in Poplar Bluff. Seconds later, her body was struck by another vehicle allegedly driven by Ressel.

Having allegedly fled the scene of the crash, Ressel was identified as the second driver and later was arrested the same day his 2014 Ford pickup was found and impounded.

Heavenly Grace Hafford

Investigators found what earlier was described as suspected “biological material” on the undercarriage of Ressel’s truck. Authorities said a lab determined the material matched Hafford’s DNA.

Copeland issued his ruling after hearing arguments from Ressel’s lawyers, Sam Spain and Chris Yarbro, and special prosecuting attorney Ian Page.

Copeland also reviewed the defense’s motion for judgment of acquittal and a stipulation signed by Spain and Page.

The stipulation said Hafford was killed “instantaneously” by the first vehicle.

The question, Copeland said, is whether a “deceased body” is a person as defined by statute. He said case law states a “deceased body is not a person, not a party (to an accident), and you can’t cause injury to a deceased body.”

Page said that was the reason he entered the stipulation, based on the fact “the coroner had determined Miss Hafford passed away” after being hit by the first vehicle.

He said Ressel would have committed a crime by causing injury to a person.

There are two elements the state must prove to convict someone on a leaving the scene of an accident — the driver left the scene without notifying authorities about the crash and property damage or an injury or fatality had occurred.

The defense provided case law that supported its argument Hafford was not a “person” as defined by statute. Therefore, it was legally impossible for the state to show injury to a person.

Page said he couldn’t find any case law contrary to what Spain had cited.

There were few cases, he said, which were “on point” regarding whether a dead body is considered a person.

With an indictment, Copeland said, there was no probable-cause affidavit for him to refer to, and he had no way of knowing other details about the allegations.

Based on the stipulation, “this court stipulates that the individual hit by Mr. Ressel’s vehicle was deceased,” Copeland said.

“That being the case” and with no further evidence, Copeland entered a judgment of acquittal as to Ressel’s leaving the scene.

With the tampering charge, Spain said, his client is accused in the indictment of suppressing or concealing his truck, but he had no duty to produce his vehicle.

Spain cited the stipulation, which states Ressel “did not bring forward his truck to law-enforcement officers investigating the accident. This is the state’s sole evidence of ‘concealment’ and/or ‘suppression’ of evidence.”

“The only evidence is Mr. Ressel did not come forward with evidence to turn over to the police,” Spain said. “(Ressel) had no duty to come forward with evidence.”

Spain said there was no statute or case law that states he had to come forward, and if it exists, it would be inconsistent with the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution against self-incrimination.

“Bringing forth evidence against himself is contrary to law” as well as the U.S. Constitution, Spain said.

With the court determining it was “legally impossible” for Ressel to have committed the crime of leaving the scene of an accident, Page argued “at that point, he had no legal claim the Fifth Amendment because there was not a crime to incriminate himself in.”

After hearing the lawyers’ arguments on the tampering charge, Copeland “tentatively denied” the defense’s motion, and said he was going to “leave (the case) open” to give himself time to consider the matter.

Copeland set at bench trial on the charge for 10 a.m. Nov. 20.

Pertinent address:

Kanell Boulevard and Maud Street, Poplar Bluff, Mo.