MISSOURI COMMENTARY; CLINTON'S WAR: HE WON IT HIS WAY

It was "Clinton's War." He won is his way. Frank Sinatra and Gen. Billy Mitchell would be very proud. The "experts," on the other hand, were all wrong. Clinton won it solely with air power and without sustaining a single combat casualty. Why were the experts so off the mark?

The army generals: Colin Powell, Norman Schwartzkopf and George Joulwan.

Powell is the most respect general in the United States, maybe in the entire world. He has given his name to the eponymous Powell doctrine: hit 'em with overwhelming force -- land, sea and air. Powell was calm, restrained and measured in his criticism of Clinton.

Schwartzkopf, the hero of Desert Storm, is now a TV talking head. Unlike Powell, he was caustic, condemning and accusatory -- the essence of contemporary TV journalism. According to "Stormin' Norman," Clinton did not have the moral prerequisites to be a commander in chief. The general said, "You cannot win wars without using infantry."

Joulwan, the American commander in Bosnia, won that war with air power alone, but that was an "aberration." Joulwan flat out said Clinton and NATO had to use ground troops to win in Kosovo. Absolutely no doubt about it.

The army generals were wrong mostly because they were army generals. They were nurtured in the West Point tradition that all wars are won by soldiers on the ground. General William Westmoreland proved that.

The statesmen-retirees: Lawrence Eagleburger, James Schlesinger, Brent Scowcroft.

Eagleburger is a former secretary of state and former ambassador to Yugoslavia. In the interlude before George Bush left office after losing to Clinton, Eagleburger and Bush declared the defense of Kosovo to be a vital national security interest of the United States. Some call it the "Lame Duck Kosovo Doctrine" From the very outset of the Kosovo war, Eagleburger has berated Clinton and his "nonsensical strategy."

Scowcroft was a gentleman. "I am happy to say I was wrong. I didn't think it could be done with air power alone." Schlesinger originally said, "Must use ground troops." After Milosevic capitulated, he waffled, saying he "doubted that air power could do it, but I must point out that air power is far more destructive today than in the past."

The Sunday pundits: Tim Russert, Bob Schieffer, Sam Donaldson, and the rest.

All dead wrong. Even after Milosevic capitulated, Scheffer said, "It sets a bad precedent to win a war without a casualty." The Sunday TV gurus should take a long rest.

All of the heretofore named individuals do not have direct access to intelligence information but do have access to knowledgeable sources. The pundits saw fit to ignore the nature of the information coming out of Belgrade.

Before I go on, I should point out that I left the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board at the end of 1998. During my five-plus years on the board, I never received a briefing or any secret information of any type about Serbia, Kosovo, or Milosevic. What I write is from public sources and discussion with knowledgeable people.

For years, the United States has had a robust intelligence operation in Serbia. In a sense, it is the last vestige of old-fashioned Cold War intelligence gathering. It is the final chapter of the old NATO vs. Warsaw Pact face-off. We know more about Milosevic than we do about Saddam Hussein because intelligence is much easier to come by in Serbia than in Iraq. We know where Milosevic lives, what he fears, what he commands and what influences his thinking.

Milosevic is not Capt. Courageous. He is not attracted to the idea of dying for his cause. No suicide in the bunker for him. He is a demonic gambler who knows when to cut his losses. Since 1991, Milosevic has started three wars and then given up on each one. He gambled on his war in Croatia. He gambled in his war in Bosnia. He gambled on his war in Kosovo. Whenever he perceives that his gamble has not succeeded, he backpedals.

The bombing in Serbia -- especially in Belgrade -- was driving Milosevic bonkers. His wife, who is his inseparable adviser, was bordering on hysteria. Some Serbs may enjoy martyrdom, refineries, office buildings, factories, telecommunication systems -- all being blown to bits. One estimate is that $100 billion worth of damage has been done to his nation. At the beginning of this century, Turkey was the "sick man" of Europe. As we end the century, it is Serbia. Milosevic simply couldn't take it any more. He reached a breaking point. The aforementioned experts were stuck on the broken record of "ground troops, ground troops, ground troops" and never understood the pressures on and past conduct of Milosevic.

It's rather easy for the Sunday pundits to be befuddled about substance. If NBC says, "Hey, what about ground troops," CBS and ABC jump on the bandwagon. Army generals insist on ground troops. Statesmen-retirees always assume they know more than their successors. The only way they can get on television is by saying they would have done something differently.

Clinton, the draft avoider, outsmarted them all. Most experts are madder than hell. They don't like Clinton. They resent that he was right and they were wrong.

Winning the peace will be tougher than winning the war. Expect to hear endless criticism form the very same people who were wrong on about how to wage the war.

~Tom Eagleton of St. Louis is a former U.S. senator from Missouri.