U.N. MUST KNOW WHEN TO SAY `NO'

United Nations Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali did not like President Clinton's U.N. speech. It's easy to understand why. Clinton, Congress and every recent study made of U.N. operations want the U.N. to "overhaul" its operations and stop spreading itself so thin. Stressing that the world body should be more selective in its peace-keeping operations, Clinton said, "The United Nations must know when to say no."

Last month, a Congressionally created bi-partisan commission focused on the following U.N. no-nos.

* "Severe management problems" and "bureaucratic inertia waste and ineptitude." Hiring practices are dreadful, deadwood abounds and slipshod out-contracting for goods and services haunt the U.N. There is urgent need for a manger (Inspector General) to be selected by the top 10 U.N. contributors to wield the axe. U.N. "credibility should not continue to be undermined" by management nightmares.

* "It is the Commission's view that too many of the world's second-rank issues appear on the U.N. agenda, weakening the institution for dealing with first-rank problems."

* There was agreement (including Clinton's speech) that U.S. responsibility for a 30% share of the U.N.'s total multi-trillion dollar budget should be reduced to 25%.

* Sadly, the United States did not send its best and brightest foreign service officers to the U.N. Assignment to the world body was deemed a career dead-end, similar to J. Edgar Hoover's FBI assigning an agent to Butte, Montana.

* "Since the end of the Cold War, U.N. peace-keeping forces have grown exponentially...THere are today some 80,000 troops under the U.N. flag, compared to about 10,000 three years ago." Peace-keeping costs were $700 million in 1991 and will go up to over $4 billion in 1993. In Cambodia alone, the U.N. dispatched some 22,000 soldiers and support personnel from 45 countries spending an unaudited $1.9 to $2.9 billion (or any number one might guess in between).

* The most strenuous disagreement on the commission concerned the creation of a U.N. rapid-reaction force. A bare majority of the commission supported the creation of a rapid-reaction force of 5,000 to 10,000 to be deployed with the approval of the Security Council. The rationale in favor of such a force focuses on the possible need for reconnaissance and crisis response before a situation escalates. The minority denounced this as the beginning of a slippery slope to an even bigger standing army with the Secretary General as global commander in chief. Clearly this is an idea whose time hasn't come.

* The commission report asks, "If the U.N. did not exist, what would we need to create today to replace it?" The answer is that with all of its warts, inefficiencies, and extravagances, there is abundant need for a worldwide organization to promote international order under law. Self-evidently, global problems require global attention. But the U.N. is often its own worst enemy. In President Clinton's words, it's got to "know when to say no" about a lot of things.