The limits of blame in the Middle East

Iraq and Syria, and the broader Middle East, are in the midst of conflicts over belief and borders.

The march of the Islamic State continues, threatening Baghdad and beyond. In this context, identity and loyalty become existential questions, as young men decide whether to enlist under the black flags of the Islamic State, or serve in the armies and militias of their nations.

It is suddenly important to answer some questions. Where should national boundaries be drawn, if at all? What is a Muslim? What does it mean to be a citizen of a nation? While it is easy to assign this turmoil to a single cause or actor, history and politics are complex.

Neither field provides clear answers on how to solve this specific quagmire, but consideration of some of the essential factors might at least help identify what questions to ask. Let us start by assigning blame, recognizing that, as satisfying as this exercise might be, it has its limits.

"Blame Woodrow Wilson."

In the midst of World War I, U.S. President Wilson advanced his "Fourteen Points," promising to use national self-determination and demographic lines to determine boundaries. This was primarily targeted against the German, Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires, with their volatile mixes of ethnic and religious minorities.

In the Middle East, the "Fourteen Points" were embraced by Jews, Kurds and Arabs. The British used the lure of independent states for these and other minorities as an inducement to rebel against the Ottoman Turks; the best example of this rebellion was the Arab Revolt, most famously advised by British officer T.E. Lawrence -- Lawrence of Arabia. Nationalism once stoked, however, was impossible to restrain, so Wilson does bear some guilt for conveying international credibility on the idea that people should be ruled by people of the same ethnicity and culture. Wilson certainly did not originate the idea of ethnic self-determination -- nationalism arose in Europe on a massive scale in the 19th century -- but his public campaign in favor of it provided impetus for it in the Middle East.

"Blame Sykes and Picot."

After having benefitted from rebellions against the Turks, and implied that national states would be forthcoming for Arabs, Jews and Kurds, the British and French decided that this had been a mistake.

Instead of allowing Arabs to create a single state, stretching from Arabia to Iran, these two European powers, through British diplomat Mark Sykes and French representative François Georges-Picot, divided the former Ottoman territories outside Turkey between them.

The lines drawn were an attempt to balance French and British strategic priorities, forestall unity among the Arabs, and enable (without guaranteeing) the possibility of a Jewish homeland in Palestine.

Arab nationalists were furious, feeling betrayed once the secret agreement came to light in late 1917.

Sykes-Picot continues to be a hated treaty in the Middle East -- although no Arab state created as a result of this agreement has been willing to surrender its independence to create a unified Arab nation. Side note: Interestingly enough, the one nation in the Middle East that was founded by a purely indigenous movement, never saw its heartland occupied by a European power, and which has not invaded, or been invaded (beyond minor border clashes), in the last century is Saudi Arabia. Not only was Saudi Arabia relatively unaffected by Sykes-Picot, the Saudi dynasty very carefully avoided entanglements with the British or French, choosing instead a commercial relationship with the United States in the 1940s, that burgeoned into a security relationship during the Cold War.

"Blame the United States."

This is the default answer for many both in the Middle East and in the United States itself. As the source of both naïve idealism (see Woodrow Wilson) and hard line realistic politics (see the alliance with Saudi Arabia), the United States is both the great savior and the great bogeyman in the region.

If anything, it is too little U.S. engagement that now threatens the stability of the Middle East, not too much.

Demands for U.S. withdrawals from Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain and elsewhere are now replaced by urgent requests for American military power to return.

From being blamed for the rise of the Islamic State, to blame for any future victories this insurgency achieves, the U.S. is in a difficult situation -- admittedly far less difficult than those Arabs, Kurds and others who are the primary victims of this fanatically violent Islamist movement.

More fundamentally than British, American and French actions, however, it has been Arabs, Kurds, Iranians and Turks who are responsible not only for initiating conflicts in the region, but for resolving them.

The U.S., UK, France and other nations can do more to assist in the destruction of the Islamic State, but even with an American ground force, which seems soon to be in place, it will be Iraqi, Syrian, Kurdish and Turkish soldiers in the lead and in the majority against the IS.

One can only blame long-dead Western diplomats for so long in the face of the guns of the IS.

History can provide an explanation for how we got to where we are, and the context by which current action can overcome past decisions, but living in the past will not change the future.

The Islamic State wants to restore a caliphate -- a single government over all Muslim lands.

What they have instead created is an increasingly unified Muslim world dedicated to uninstalling this faux caliphate.

If this coalition is successful in consigning the Islamic State to the unlamented past, perhaps at the same time the region can move beyond blaming nefarious foreigners, and engage instead in building a better future -- mindful of the past, but no longer chained to it.

Wayne Bowen, a U.S. Army veteran, received his Ph.D. in history from Northwestern University. He resides in Cape Girardeau.