Embracing the Kurdish option?

In the midst of the dramatic gains by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) terrorist group, some Americans familiar with the region, among whom I would count myself, are beginning to question not just the failures of the Obama administration that contributed to these circumstances. Might there be opportunity in Iraq's catastrophe to revisit what seemed a settled issue? Is it time to support an independent state for the Kurds?

In 2004, during my tour of Iraq, I was stationed in Mosul, a majority Sunni Arab city of almost 2 million, recently overrun by ISIS and its allies. At times, my missions took me to Iraqi Kurdistan, an autonomous region that borders Iran, Turkey and Syria. The Kurds, a group ethnically and culturally distinct from their Persian, Turkish and Arab neighbors, are the largest nationality in the Middle East -- perhaps the world -- without their own nation-state. This could be about to change, and the United States should welcome such a possibility. Kurdistan is already the most stable, democratic, prosperous and pro-Western region in Iraq, with the potential for even greater strength if it makes a final break from Baghdad.

For years, the U.S. has supported Iraq's territorial integrity. Even during the U.S.-led invasion of 2003, when the Kurdish pesh merga -- militia units renowned for their courage and competence -- were the only militarily-effective Iraqi allies we had, the U.S. government pushed back against Kurdish ambitions to declare their independence. We urged Kurds to maintain their regional autonomy within Iraq. The Kurds recognized this was their best strategic option at the time, given the adamant resistance of Iran, Turkey and Syria, and the central Iraqi government, to secession. At the prodding of the U.S., a Kurd was chosen for the Iraqi presidency in the power-sharing arrangements that emerged, and patiently waited for more comprehensive agreements over the sensitive topics of petroleum revenues and control over the oil-rich region of Kirkuk.

Over the past few years, however, the Kurds have seen the Shia-led government of Nouri al-Maliki renege on promises for genuine negotiations, at the same time watching with concern the exclusion of Sunni Arabs from the government. The geopolitics of the Middle East also has changed dramatically since the Kurds initially accepted the promise of the New Iraq. Syria is embroiled in a civil war, with Syrian Kurds successfully defending northeast Syria against both ISIS and the Syrian regime.

Iran is focused on its nuclear program and the threat of ISIS. Most importantly, the Turkish government, for years the strongest opponent of an independent Iraqi Kurdistan, fearing it could lead to calls for unification Turkish Kurds, has warmed to the possibility.

Turkish representatives in northern Iraq have toned down previous threats to intervene in the case of Kurdish independence, a major change from the only state in the region with the military capability to preventing such a move.

For its tacit support of an independent Iraqi Kurdistan, Turkey would no doubt demand the explicit exclusion of its own Kurds from the new state, including formal recognition of the border, verifiable security agreements to share intelligence on pro-independence Kurds in Turkey, and favorable commercial arrangements.

For the U.S., the emergence of an independent Iraqi Kurdistan would create an iron wall against which ISIS assaults would make no additional northern or eastern progress. Americans have long been safe and welcome in Kurdistan, an attitude that would be reflected in the policies of an independent Kurdish state.

The loss of Iraqi Kurdistan would be a blow to Baghdad sufficient to cause the collapse of the government of Nouri al-Maliki, and prevent a similar one from emerging. This could provide an opportunity for genuine national reconciliation in what would remain of Iraq.

With the current Kurdish president certain to join his brethren in independent Kurdistan, the position would be available for a Sunni Arab, with a new Shia Arab leader -- perhaps former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi -- to unite the nation, including Sunni tribes currently in an uneasy alliance with ISIS. This also would provide a chance for Iraq, under new leadership, to re-engage with its alienated Arab neighbors, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Kuwait, on the basis of real partnership.

There were better options for Iraq and the United States; indeed, from 2004 until early 2011, a succession of prime ministers, including both Allawi and Maliki, governed with multi-ethnic and multi-party coalitions.

When the last American forces left in December 2011, the moderating influence of the U.S. was replaced by nudges from Shia Iran, which increased its engagement as the Obama administration was withdrawing.

The price for this support became clear, as Maliki systematically drove key Sunni politicians and military officers from their positions, replacing them with Shia allies. Rising Sunni resentment provided fuel for a coalition with ISIS, which exploded out of Syria in late 2013, offering Sunnis a way to strike back at a government seen, with good reason, as an Iranian proxy.

Wondering "what might have been," however satisfying, does not deliver results in a conflict such as this.

There is still time -- if perhaps only days or weeks -- for a real effort at ethnic and religious reconciliation between Shia Arabs, Sunni Arabs and Kurds in Iraq.

What is clear is that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is incapable of leading this last effort at unity. The longer he stays, the greater the certainty that the world will see, and the U.S. should welcome, an independent Iraqi Kurdistan.

Wayne Bowen, a U.S. Army veteran, received his Ph.D. in history from Northwestern University. He resides in Cape Girardeau.