'We will' -- The U.S. and the regional power of Saudi Arabia

Conventional wisdom was that the power of Saudi Arabia, the world's leading oil producer, depended on high petroleum prices and a strategic partnership with the United States, coordinated on all major international issues (other than Arab-Israeli matters). The last few years have shown that neither of those two conditions was necessary; indeed, the regional strength of Saudi Arabia has, if anything, increased even as oil prices have collapsed and the Obama Administration has continued to disappoint its friends in the Middle East.

On a range of issues, Saudi Arabia has argued against the paths taken by President Obama; in almost every case, the Saudis have been more accurate in their assessments than the White House. The early U.S. embrace of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, promoted by White House advisers as a liberal and democratic version of political Islam, was disastrous. Once in power, the Egyptian Brotherhood, led by the now-jailed Mohammed Morsi, launched campaigns against Christians and women, supported the terrorists of Hamas, and encouraged radical movements throughout the region. The Muslim Brotherhood also crippled the Egyptian economy, cracked down on what limited freedoms the Egyptians had enjoyed, and became so hated that even liberal and secular Egyptians welcomed the military intervention of 2013 that ousted the Islamists.

The Saudis had warned from the beginning that endorsing the Muslim Brotherhood, and refusing to support longtime U.S. ally Hosni Mubarak, would lead to chaos and a strategic threat to the region. Rather than being supportive of Egypt's new president, former general Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi, who rescued his nation from the Brotherhood and is now the elected leader, the U.S. imposed sanctions and has slowed aid and arms sales.

The Saudis, however, consistently opposed the Muslim Brotherhood, encouraged moderate Egyptian leaders, and have been unstinting in their support for President el-Sisi. It is quite remarkable to observe a situation in which the U.S. has been supportive of Islamists, while Saudi Arabia, a monarchy whose constitution is the Quran, has been more in league with secular, liberal and military forces.

The Saudis were also prescient on Syria, arguing early and vociferously for a policy to oust dictator Basher al-Assad, who turned machine guns and airstrikes against peaceful protesters in 2011, thus beginning a civil war. Saudi funds, training and equipment went to Syrian rebels as early as 2011, and strongly urged the U.S. and other Western nations to support the Free Syrian Army, which in 2012 and 2013 was a moderate Sunni force with wide support.

Unfortunately, the U.S. stood by, leading to a radicalization of the rebel movement and to the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Al Nusra Front and other groups. Disappointment with the U.S. accelerated in 2013, when President Obama, having threatened to bomb Syrian chemical weapons, backed away after the Russians promised to shepherd through the dismantling of their Syrian ally's arsenal. Again, the world saw another crisis in which Saudi Arabia implored the U.S. to take action; had we done so, the road to power for ISIS would have been much more difficult.

Saudi Arabia now expresses deep skepticism about the draft nuclear agreement with Iran, arguing it will strengthen Iran's capability to wreak havoc in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Yemen, where Tehran's proxies continue to wage war, and support terrorism, and denounce the West.

A nuclear deal with Iran will be one more sign to the Saudis that the U.S. continues to be uninterested in advice from the leading Arab state, and that the alliance between the two nations will continue to fray so long as Barack Obama is in the White House.

Saudi Arabia, however, is not a state that relies on petitioning the U.S. for action. Indeed, one major result of U.S. weakness in the region under Obama has been a more active Saudi foreign policy. The message from Riyadh to Washington has been, whether on Syria or Iran: "If you don't take care of this, we will." Indeed, recent rapid decline in oil prices has, ironically, actually strengthened Saudi Arabia. While Saudi revenue has declined, their financial and petroleum reserves allow them to survive years at current prices per barrel; Iran and Russia, two rival states, have been weakened by the collapse.

The Saudi military also has shown itself capable in surprising ways, with airstrikes in Syria and Iraq against ISIS, and in Yemen against Iran-backed Houthi rebels. There also have been reports of Saudi special forces taking action in these areas, with contingency plans for even stronger actions. The Gulf Cooperation Council, a Saudi-led organization of oil-producing states, has developed a real command structure, enhanced its military interoperability, and resolved its differences to function more like the regional alliance the Persian Gulf needs to face threats from Iran, terrorism and piracy.

Indeed, one long-term impact of the mixed signals, ineffectiveness, and missed opportunities by the Obama Administration in the Middle East will be the emergence of Saudi Arabia, not just as an economic and political force, but as a regional power with broad military capacity. Today in the Middle East only Israel has the ability to launch significant combat forces beyond its frontiers.

We shall perhaps see how the region will be different when it is not the United States, but Saudi Arabia, at the head of a coalition of states confronting Iran, ISIS and other threats. If this does come to be, it will be the Obama Administration that has enabled this strategic shift, and the consequent questions about whether that will augur a better future.

Wayne Bowen received his Ph.D. in history from Northwestern University, and is also an Army veteran.