The Umbrage Doctrine

During the recent Syrian imbroglio, in which President Obama threatened to attack Syria, then begged Congress to stop him, then thanked Vladimir Putin for rescuing the regime in Damascus, an interesting discussion emerged over international law.

The administration argued that, despite there being no Syrian threat against the United States, no attack on U.S. allies, no authorization by the U.N. Security Council, or even the fig leaf of resolutions by the Arab League or NATO, that the use of force against Syrian chemical weapons was justified on moral grounds.

Ironically, Democratic political leaders -- including Joe Biden -- who had most vociferously argued that President George W. Bush was "going it alone" against Iraq, could not even cobble together the same coalition that the U.S. had during that military action in 2003.

When a U.S. president -- in this case, Barack Obama -- cannot even gain the support of the United Kingdom, our closest ally -- it is a measure of the international isolation of that leader. How remarkable is it that Obama, once hailed globally, from the Nobel Peace Prize Committee, is now less popular in much of the world, including in Israel and the Arab world, than his predecessor?

The president's declaration of a "red line" -- despite his subsequent denial of ownership of the comment -- and the secretary of state's use of the curious phrase "moral obscenity" about Syria's chemical weapons use -- were attempts to conduct foreign policy under what could be called "The Umbrage Doctrine."

This approach would mean U.S. activities, including the use of force, would be driven by the most offensive global activity at any one particular moment.

As trial lawyers and judges often joke, when you have the law on your side, argue the law; when you have the facts, argue the facts; when you have neither, pound the table so loudly no one will realize you have neither. The Umbrage Doctrine is a clear example of pounding the table, but in the international arena where the stakes are far higher than in a single trial.

The president of the United States has the legal authority under the Constitution, as commander-in-chief of the U.S. military, to intervene rapidly, decisively and effectively, under conditions that because of the urgency do not delay that a congressional authorization would require. Had President Obama struck Syrian targets within days after Basher Assad's use of chemical weapons in late August, his actions would have been supported by Congress and the American people. A sudden strike, using cruise missiles and other stand-off weapons, hitting key military infrastructure and command nodes, would have been an unmistakable message to Syria: Use weapons of mass destruction and you will pay a price.

Would there have been protests on the left and right? Would many nations have "tut-tutted" and called for "peaceful negotiations"? Might the UN General Assembly have condemned the U.S., while ignoring the deaths of more than 100,000 at Syrian hands? Absolutely. However, U.S. prestige and credibility would have risen overnight in the Middle East. Syria would never again consider using chemical weapons. Iran would begin taking seriously U.S. threats, and U.S. allies such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Israel would feel assured of U.S. resolve.

For those interested in the politics of it, Obama's popularity would be rising, instead of collapsing, as it has since his Syrian debacle. The Russians would have continued to support Syria, but would have been more circumspect about expending their diplomatic and military capital over a regime under such pressure.

The lesson now to Syria, as well as to Iran, North Korea and other nations hostile to the U.S.: You can stand up to the United States, and emerge not only alive, but able to claim victory. The trick is to survive long enough so the level of U.S. offense taken at your actions falls low enough, or is so distracted by other events, that you no longer seem to be the meanest person on the planet.

Amazingly, the U.S. is now committed to the survival of the Assad regime, with the Russians partners with us in verifying the destruction of the very weapons they enabled Syria to amass.

Do any international observers seriously believe this will be a serious process, with full transparency by the Syrians? As recently as a few days before their use of nerve gas, the Syrian government denied it even had these weapons. Will they now be more truthful than Saddam Hussein or Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was about their weapons of mass destruction? It seems unlikely.

The problem with The Umbrage Doctrine, based as it is on feelings of the moment, is that it is no basis for the actions of a superpower. U.S. policy needs to be driven by far more substantial motives than unplanned comments about "red lines" or strategies, such as the proposed attack on Syria, developed without input from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, secretary of state or director of national intelligence. While moral arguments are necessary in developing and presenting for U.S. policies, they alone should not be the drivers of it.

Hopefully, the recent failure of the president's Syrian approach also will signal the end of the short-lived Umbrage Doctrine.

Wayne Bowen, a U.S. Army veteran, received his Ph.D. in history from Northwestern University. He resides in Cape Girardeau.