RUSSIANS FACE TOUGH DECISIONS

Russia is in trouble, and there is little the United States can do about it. Yet the events there the next few weeks will resonate powerfully in the future of our lives.

A year and half ago, a political upheaval took place in what was then the Soviet Union. Several hard-line communist leaders from the ranks of state-run industry, the military, the secret police and the Communist Party hierarchy organized a putsch against Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. After early success, the putsch was defeated by Boris Yeltsin and his corps of reform-minded democrats. Yeltsin rode the success of that resistance to the pinnacle of post-Soviet power.

Today, however, Russian President Yeltsin stands embattled by the same forces that brought down Gorbachev.

Yeltsin is a fascinating man a proud, street-smart and politically cunning leader, who has died at least two major political deaths in his life before resurrecting himself each time to greater power.

While as president he has failed to develop a democratic foundation in Russia, he is more democratic-minded than the others who stand around him in Russian government today.

This weekend the hardliners stripped Yeltsin of legislative power. Through their domination of the Congress of People's Deputies a hold-over from the communist regime they have legislatively taken over the Russian government and the formation of its policies.

I do not expect Yeltsin to take this usurpation quietly. But there is little he can do short of declaring a constitutional emergency and trying to rule by presidential decree (which would be the antithesis of democratic leadership). It is unclear what will happen if he makes this choice.

Much of Yeltsin's success depends on whose side the military takes. There is a strong possibility the military will split. This division may not be bad if it keeps the military from playing much of a part at all. On the other hand, it could mean civil war.

For the time being, the different branches of the Russian military are singing the same tune: this is a political battle, not a military one.

Before declaring a constitutional emergency, Yeltsin will probably try once more for a national vote on whom should have greater power: the president or the congress. However, the vote would have no legal weight, and it would be unlikely to solve anything even if Yeltsin would win (which is uncertain).

The specter of the only country that can destroy the United States in political and economic chaos should concern us. But there is little that the United States can or should do now, other than to make our interests clear (which President Clinton is doing).

This is because the Russian crisis is an internal Russian matter. The political arguments are not centered on East-West relations or on Western aid, although these issues play a part. They are centered on power, and whose vision of Russia will prevail. (The hardliners derive their power from the old system of state-run industry and collective farming. The reformers want to break this system up).

While the call for the United States to give tens of billions of dollars of aid to the Russians to bail them out of their increasingly deteriorating economic crisis will be heard, frankly, it would be a mistake to do so (and would not have much effect, anyway). We should especially not tie aid to Yeltsin; this might actually exacerbate the problems.

Instead, we should reaffirm our commitment to a peaceful and democratic Russia. But whether and how peace and democracy are achieved is ultimately for the Russians themselves to decide.