Russia and its allies: The reward of loyalty

During the early 1980s, one of President Ronald Reagan's national security team was complaining to a more seasoned diplomat about the western Europeans, bemoaning their low levels of military spending, risk-averse approach to the USSR, and reluctance to support bold U.S. moves.

"Would you trade our allies for theirs?" was the response. "If you don't like Belgium and France, try depending on North Korea and Ethiopia for anything but trouble."

Russia's closest overseas partners have long been a rogue's gallery of unsavory regimes, from Sudan to Cuba to Iran to Burma -- uniformly undemocratic, unfree and hostile to the United States. The most recent example in the news, the Syrian Arab Republic, is not only a brutal state, but also immersed in a civil war, fighting against a rebellion supported by most of the country's Sunni majority.

Some international observers have expressed frustration at Russia's continued military support of the Syrian dictatorship; news stories routinely cover Moscow's sales of missiles, armored vehicles, ammunition and aircraft to the beleaguered regime of Basher al-Assad.

Despite calls by the United States, European Union and even most Arab League states, President Vladimir Putin continues to equip the Syrian armed forces with everything it needs to wage war on its own people. This behavior by the Russians, despite all the hand-wringing engendered in the West, should by now be expected practice.

The Russian Federation, following the example of the Soviet Union that preceded it, alone among the major powers, exhibits unquestioning loyalty to its client states and allies.

Pledging loyalty to the United States has always been a mixed blessing for minor states; while the U.S. has been for decades the world's most powerful nation, it also has an internal constituency predisposed to look with disfavor on any nation willing to align itself with the U.S. overseas.

The hypocrisy of the left, which for decades criticized right-wing military dictatorships in Latin America, while ignoring far more pervasive human rights violations in communist Cuba, is one example of this double standard.

South Korea, South Vietnam, Israel, Spain, Turkey and other U.S. allies have, over the decades, faced boycotts, media campaigns, congressional investigations and other punitive actions organized by those who ignored mass murder, death camps and genocide occurring in anti-American regimes.

Even at the national level, the U.S. has often not proved itself a steadfast ally. Consider the recent experiences of the Arab Spring, when longtime allied states, most notably Hosni Mubarak's Egypt, found itself abandoned by the United States the moment public demonstrations grew to an unmanageable size.

The Russians are playing the long game in Syria. While the U.S. and European Union dither on whether to provide even modest military aid to the side -- the rebellion -- we publicly support, the Russians deliver whatever military hardware the Syrian regime wants, with generous credit terms.

The long game is not just Moscow's effort to remain relevant in the Middle East, but also to send a message to every other state in the world considering where to seek weapons, diplomatic support and commercial ties among the major powers -- the U.S., Russia, China, France and UK.

The Russians ask no questions about human rights or democracy, making no demands on their clients for internal reforms. With a U.S. alliance, small states can expect a far greater level of inquiry.

"Elections," demands the U.S., even when those elections can lead, as they did in every Arab state where they have been held, to Islamist victory. "Free prisoners," demands the U.S., even when, as with our own former detainees from Guantánamo Bay, the released often re-engage in open struggle.

While relations with the U.S. are clearly better for those with commercial and economic needs, with greater access to foreign aid and capital, for those interested primarily in security and firepower, it is hard to argue with the "no questions, no drama" approach of the Russians.

Even if a nation -- by culture, values and international perspective -- is more oriented toward the West, Russia is a more reliable partner for states that prefer to avoid external criticism of their systems.

For decades to come, small nations of the world will remember Syria, and the respective approaches of the U.S. and Russia.

If you want consistency, call Moscow. If you want complexity and ambivalence, the U.S. State Department will be happy to hear from you, at least until CNN sends its intrepid reporters to your doorstep, pointing out in an expose that your human rights record is not as unblemished as Sweden's, at which point you may wish your original message had been to the Kremlin.

Wayne Bowen, a U.S. Army veteran, received his Ph.D. in history from Northwestern University. He resides in Cape Girardeau.