MISSOURI COMMENTARY: WHAT COMES AFTER THE SIEGE OF GROZNY? IT'S YELTSIN'S FATE

It was just four short years ago that elite Russian troops stormed the television tower in Vilnius, the capital of Lithuania. The assault was intended to silence the demands from the Baltic states for independence. Five days later, the same elite troops hit the Interior MInistry in Riga, Latvia, for the same purpose -- to clamps down on the clamor for independence.

Mikhail Gorbachev claims he did not order either of these attacks, but he also admits he didn't condemn them. He acquiesced in silence as events overwhelmed him. He was losing control.

Democratic political forces were sickened by what happened in the Baltic. Right wingers were sickened that Gorbachev could not adhere to a hard line.

Boris Yeltsin is in the same throes of indecision. He can't go soft. He can't go hard. Much of the time he can't go at all.

Gorbachev and Yeltsin, inveterate antagonists, would find no similarities between themselves, but historians will see that, in their falling months, there were common traits.

Both started out as typical Soviet autocrats. Both Gorbachev and Yeltsin viewed themselves as leaders who wanted to modernize their country. Both initiated liberal reforms.

Both botched the game. Both were pulled every which way by political factions,industrial and agricultural interests and the military.

Yeltsin has trouble making decisions, but, it can be argued, he can make them a lot quicker than the Stevensonesque Gorbachev. No doubt the basic military policy in Chechnya originated with Yeltsin's power group within the Kremlin, rather than with dissident elements of the military and security forces beyond Moscow.

The outcome in Chechnya will be placed on Yeltsin's back. For him it is lose-lose. If he has to pulverize Grozny, the capital city, and subject the people to ruthless assault, he is a loser. If President Jokar Dudaev is chased from the region by Yeltsin's tanks, he is a loser. If Dudaev dies, it's even worse.

Yeltsin knows that today in Chechnya could be tomorrow in Ossetia, Tartarstan or Bashkortostan or Yakurta or in some other remote area of his vast land. Peace does not prevail in the entirety of Russia. The common denominator of vast Russia is unrest, resentment, disunion, and disillusionment.

Yeltsin hangs on by two threads, one medical and one political. He is a sick man. He is unable to perform his duties with vigor and sustained concentration. He is, like Gorbachev in his final months, increasingly isolated from political reality.

In some Russian polls, Yeltsin has a 15 percent approval rating. Allowing for the speculative nature of Russian polls with an error factor of "plus or minus 10 percent," this means he is either the most hated man in Russia or almost the most hated man in Russia. Most Russians can't comprehend his bullyboy tactics in Chechnya, with the exception of right wing extremist Vladimir Zhirinovsky. With his support, Yeltsin must know he's marking down Disaster Lane.

Yeltsin's opposition in parliament is akin to what you might expect from the U.S. Congress. If by some miracle it all turns out satisfactorily, then the members of parliament will say "See, I told you so." If it develops into a disaster, then those same members will say ":See, I told you so."

Regardless of the Chechnya outcome, the Russian army is going to be unwilling to get embroiled in other ethnic troubles in that vast country.

When Gorbachev was weakening, President George Bush was accused of putting all of America's diplomatic cards in the Gorby basket. Now the diplomatic quarterbacks are leveling the same criticism at President Bill Clinton for his continued support of the fading Yeltsin.

What would the critics have us do? Do we grope around in the political weeds in Moscow and anoint "America's favorite" to succeed Yeltsin? Crazy. "USA certified" would be a kiss of death for any Russian leader. With Russia we take the leaders as we find 'em. We hope, whenever Yeltsin's days are over, that we will find one in a business suit who has a sense of leadership and an ability to cope with the Russian military.

There are names in the State Department files. We know some people with potential. But for us to think we could trigger, in even the faintest of ways, the downfall of one regime and the rise of another is fiction of the highest order.

We wait for Yeltsin to run out his string.

~Tom Eagleton is a former U.S. senator from Missouri and a columnist for the Pulitzer Publishing Co.