Intervention in Syria: Three imperatives

The Obama administration announced in recent days that it will begin arming Syrian rebels as they struggle to overturn the dictatorship of Bashar Assad and his Baathist state.

While it is true that this military aid likely will be meager and is starting more than two years after major resistance began, it is still in the interests of the United States to participate indirectly in this war.

U.S. military aid to the rebellion, while not inherently decisive on the battlefield, could shift momentum in their direction.

Under the current stalemate, it seems increasingly unlikely that the Baathist regime will be able to reconquer all of Syria, even with the support it has received from Russia.

While few areas are clearly in rebel hands, and the government retains the ability to strike with air and heavy weapons almost anywhere, the authority of the state barely extends beyond the literal footprints -- and tank treads -- of its armed forces.

Kurdish forces, for example, are increasingly carving out an autonomous region in the northeast -- remarkably similar to what has happened in northern Iraq, with communities throughout Syria in the hands of other rebel groups. Without external intervention, Syria could witness a long, fragmenting conflict, with no victor or final resolution.

With the news of U.S. weapons -- as well as intelligence, nonlethal aid, and increasing diplomatic support -- headed for the rebellion, wavering Sunni Arab leaders in Syria might see the time as opportune to withdraw their indispensable support for the Assad regime.

U.S. aid also will encourage other states, including Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Qatar, to provide even more substantial assistance to the rebellion. As a result, U.S. military aid could hasten the end of the war, potentially reducing the humanitarian catastrophe in Syria, which has thus far cost the lives of almost 100,000.

A clear victory by the rebels, and the end of the regime in Damascus, would provide the best opportunity to move quickly to peace and a transitional government. There are no guarantees, but even a weak, divided and conflicted coalition government would be better than the current Syrian regime, engaged as it is in massive violence against its own people.

U.S. aid to the rebels also will contribute to the weakening of Iran and its radical allies. A few years ago, fears were high of an Iranian crescent, linking Iran with Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Hamas in the Gaza Strip. With the Obama administration's unnecessary abandonment of Iraq, and the temporary alliance of Hamas (radical, but Sunni) with Iran, these were legitimate concerns.

If Syria's regime falls, however, the crescent will collapse, as any new state in Syria will almost certainly be Sunni-dominated, and hostile to an Iran that had supported the Assad dynasty.

Iran is obviously terrified at the prospect of losing its main ally, and has provided not just military aid to Syria, but has sent Iranian "volunteers" to join the struggle, as well as directing its Hezbollah allies in Lebanon to do the same.

The tens of thousands of Shia militia men who have responded to Tehran's calls have not turned the tide in Syria, but they have provoked anger throughout the Arab world, with a dramatic drop in the popularity of Hezbollah and Iran itself.

When the Iranian crescent claimed to be at war with Israel, despite the timidity of their efforts, they were tolerated by Arab populations. Now that they are in actual war against fellow Muslims in Syria, they now are less popular than the United States in the region -- quite an achievement. Some Arabs even have been quietly contrasting Iran unfavorably with Israel, a stunning reversal.

Finally, if the U.S. is careful in its channeling of military aid, it can have a dramatic impact on determining which rebel groups emerge stronger at the end of the Syrian civil war.

The rise of al-Qaida in Syria has been facilitated by the U.S. remaining aloof from this conflict for too long. Many of the more secular rebel groups, without the international connections of al-Qaida, were slaughtered in earlier battles with the Syrian dictatorship.

Waiting for two years, as the Obama administration did, enabled al-Qaida to gain battlefield victories, establish logistical support for their fighters, and to be seen as the force leading the rebellion. Even so, there are still rebels in the fight who do not share al-Qaida's vision.

We should, for example, support some of the more effective Kurdish units, especially those with ties to our long-term Iraqi Kurdish allies. There also are several Sunni areas relatively untouched by the fighting, which would follow the lead of prominent Arab generals, in Army units that are not trusted by the Assad regime, should they defect to the rebellion with their men and equipment.

Finally, the U.S. should look for leaders in the Druze, Christian and Alawite communities who would welcome a chance to participate in the struggle. Supporting factions such as these would widen the rebellion, and provide essential counterweights to al-Qaida in shaping a successor regime.

The aftermath of the Syrian Civil War is likely to be ugly, brutal and unpleasant, with score-settling and ongoing humanitarian needs.

One need only look to Libya to see that in the short term, the end of a conflict can be more hazardous than life under the dictatorship that preceded it. However, in the case of Syria, the U.S. has the means and the strategic imperative to shape the end of a conflict that we did not want, cause or need.

Wayne Bowen, a U.S. Army veteran, received his Ph.D. in history from Northwestern University. He resides in Cape Girardeau.