Checking Russia in Ukraine: A new path

The pro-Russian rebels in Ukraine have proved themselves militarily incompetent, continuing to lose ground to the Ukrainian military and, through their shoot-down of Malaysia's MH17 aircraft, united U.S. and European opinion more strongly against Vladimir Putin than did his brazen seizure of the Crimean Peninsula.

Even so, Russia continues to provide these ragtag bands of sketchy extremists with weapons, intelligence, training, funds and even direct military assistance. Why? What does Russia gain that is so valuable, that they are willing to endure economic sanctions, denunciations from Western diplomats, a decline in foreign investment and economic recession?

While the Obama administration scolds Russia for its intervention in Ukraine, Moscow is achieving its strategic objectives there. Perhaps in his heart-of-hearts President Putin dreams of occupying Ukraine, his actual goals are probably more modest, and certainly within his reach.

Ukraine is in what Russian leaders refer to as their "near abroad," those states that border Russia, were part of the USSR, or lie within their traditional sphere of influence. While ideally Putin would like to dominate these states, as he does Belarus and some of the central Asian republics, in practice the Russians have a negative goal: to prevent any nation within the "near abroad" from gaining economic independence, and especially from becoming part of NATO or the European Union.

Even if the last Russian-supported uprising collapses tomorrow, Ukraine has been seriously weakened by these events, and is consequently less likely to be invited into either NATO or the EU. The Russians hope to do to Ukraine what they did to Georgia in 2008; destabilize the country, justify an invasion on the basis of instability, then permanently occupy part of the country, in the interest of protecting pro-Russian ethnic minorities against that same alleged instability.

Before Putin seized Crimea in early 2014 and instigated a faux-rebellion among ethnic Russians in eastern Ukraine, the Ukrainian economy and military were fragile. Even so, both the EU and NATO saw Ukraine as a possible candidate for membership at some point in the future.

Now fighting an insurgency, and facing economic warfare from Russia, Ukraine is weaker than at any point since it became independent from the USSR. Kiev's military, while winning against Russian separatists, is facing severe strains, with heavy casualties and equipment losses.

Support from the U.S. to Ukraine has been tepid and timid. Despite proclaiming support for the territorial integrity of Ukraine, and the elected government now under attack by Russia, the Obama administration has refused to sell significant military equipment to the Ukrainians.

Initial offers of MREs (Meals, Ready to Eat) and other humanitarian aid were openly derided in the Russian press as the actions of a weak state.

What Ukraine needs is not food, but hardware, and a chance to defend its own people and terrain. The U.S. should provide air defense systems, replenishment of heavy weapons (tanks, combat aircraft, artillery), and more intangible tools, such as satellite imagery. We could also enable allies to do the same. Poland, for example, strongly supports Ukraine, and would do more if given assurances by the U.S. that we would endorse these actions.

Russia is paying very little cost for its aggression in Ukraine. Mild economic sanctions are only an inconvenience. In fact, Putin has slapped on his own retaliatory sanctions, banning imports of certain EU products.

While Ukraine will eventually retake the territories now held by separatists, at the end of that struggle their military and police forces will be exhausted, with Kiev less able to withstand additional Russian pressure. A private commitment by NATO to make good all of Ukraine's losses, indirectly communicated to the Russians, would bolster Ukrainian morale, while also accelerating the costs to Russia for its brazen intervention.

In addition to real economic sanctions against Russian's oil and gas industries, the only genuinely profitable part of their economy, the U.S. should talk less in public, and act more. Without fanfare, the U.S. should undertake a major military exercise in Ukraine, involving other NATO forces.

This would be a clear signal of our support for Kiev's independence, and provide opportunities to coach their military. A major program to train and equip the Ukrainian army, along NATO standards, would be another clear signal. The U.S. is considering what to do with billions in leftover vehicles and weapons used in Afghanistan; surely some of this could be delivered to Ukraine, rather than sold for scrap, as currently planned.

Finally, President Barack Obama, Secretary of State John Kerry and the rest of the administration should cease talking about Ukraine. The more the West speaks out against Putin, the higher his popularity rises in Russia. Every speech by an American, British or Dutch politician also increases Putin's credibility among states, such as India and China, which reflexively resist European and American finger-wagging.

It is time for the Russians to start being concerned about our moves, rather than mocking our weakness and Obama's indecisiveness.

It is uncertainty, rather than clear declarations of a "red line" or that something is "unacceptable" that will raise concerns, and perhaps reconsiderations of policy, in Moscow.

The Russians know, and are willing to pay, the current costs for their interference in Ukraine. If they no longer know what the U.S. is doing, and diplomatic flailing gives way to tangible assistance to the democratically elected government in Kiev, Moscow's path will suddenly become more muddled. It would be a refreshing change for it to be the Kremlin, rather than the White House, that seems unsure of its next move.

Wayne Bowen, a U.S. Army veteran, received his Ph.D. in history from Northwestern University. He resides in Cape Girardeau.