BE OUR GUEST: STILL WAITING: MIA/POWs ABANDONED

Ken Scheer is a long-time Cape Girardeau resident. He is active in business and civic affairs.

To view the current MIA/POW question in true perspective it is necessary for us to reflect back to the end of the French-Indo China war when France was defeated by the Vietnamese at Dien Bien Phu. It is reported that the Vietnamese government withheld thousands of French prisoners after the war ended in an effort to ransom them back to the French government for substantial cash payments. The Vietnamese called the French prisoners their "pearls" as they represented a significant value to the government.

During the 1954 French withdrawal from North Vietnam, the French gave the Vietnamese construction equipment, railroad equipment, and various pieces of land and water equipment. Additionally, stores of non-military supplies were provided. From 1955 until sometime in 1970, the French government paid the Democratic Republic of North Vietnam an estimated $30 million via Hungarian banks for the maintainence of French military graves. In return, the North Vietnamese periodically repatriated remains of French military dead.

Historically, the Vietnamese government has never admitted to holding prisoners against their will. Actual numbers of MIA/POWs from past and current wars continue to be clouded by uncertainty and denials from the North Vietnamese government.

To resolve the lingering question of unaccounted for MIA/POWs from the Indo China war, the French foreign ministry declared all MIA/POWs "dead" in 1971. The noted author and historian Bernard Fall, suggested that the actual number of casualties and MIA/POWs in Indo China was never resolved with certainty.

Western political thinkers have difficulty understanding the Eastern mentality when evaluating human life. Eastern political thought appears to discount the value of human existence in deference to the value offered the society as a whole. Several years age, CBS news interviewed North Vietnamese general Giap, who conducted the military strategy during the American involvement. He was asked about the "moral concern" for loss of life when Vietnamese women and children were used as "human cannon fodder" during combat. With a "sweeping gesture of his hand," he swept away the significance of military deaths as being a price to pay for "national victory."

In 1973, the United States government was trying to "back-away" from its embroiled entanglement in the Asian War. The American military machine had diminished in its effectiveness, and the American people saw no ultimate victory in continued pursuit of the war.

It is said that "Time is on the side of those who are willing to wait." The North Vietnamese were willing to allow time to diminish the value of MIA/POWs, and render them "forgotten." Again, continual denial of the existence of MIAs and POWs seemed to be a continuing method of operation for the Vietnamese government. The Americans wanted out of the war, and the North Vietnamese had thousands of prisoners to use as "pawns" in the negotiating process.

Five days after the signing of the Peace Accord, Henry Kissinger hand-carried a letter dated Feb. 1, 1973, to the North Vietnamese Prime Minister. The letter detailed the administration's interpretation of a clause in the Paris Accord, Article 21, which "pledged that the United States would contribute to the healing of wounds of war and post-reconstruction of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam." Preliminary reparations consisted of $1.3 billion of construction supplies and equipment.

Congress realized full-well, if Kissinger did not, that the soothing words "reconstruction" actually meant "reparations." The American people never paid war reparations when no crime was committed. Congress saw Kissinger's plan as a betrayal and an admission of guilt.

The White House began to understand the extent of the political problem that it was going to have with the aid plan. One news report from Paris stated that the U.S. negotiators refused to acknowledge whether "reparations" to North Vietnam were being discussed.

Secretary of State William Rogers refused to rule out reconstruction aid to the North Vietnamese by Presidential order if Congress failed to appropriate the funds. Three times Rogers called for "restraint" by members of Congress in making adverse comments on the aid issue, "at least until American troops were out of Vietnam and all American prisoners are released."

Reports of torture and mistreatment by Hanoi stirred new attacks in Congress against U.S. aid to North Vietnam. Senate Leader Mike Mansfield of Montana said the torture stories had not changed his position that aid to Hanoi would help insure the peace. On Feb. 6, 1973 the United States Congress voted "to bar any aid to North Vietnam unless Congress specifically approved". The 88 to 3 roll call vote in the Senate combined with a general sentiment in Congress indicating that there was little chance that Congress was going to vote for the administration's request for aid to Vietnam.

The final death blow for the "payment of reparations to North Vietnam" occurred a week later when Armed Services Chairman F. Edward Hebert served notice that he would introduce a proposal prohibiting any U.S. aid for North Vietnam. The Louisiana Democratic said, "Justification for President Nixon's request for $1.3 billion in aid to Southeast Asia so far is either nebulous or non-existent." The next day after Chairman Hebert had made his statement intending to introduce a proposal to prohibit aid to Hanoi, the Nixon Administration made definitive statement that there were "no more Americans alive in Southeast Asia."

The conclusion can be drawn from the aforementioned material suggesting that the United States Congress was not fully aware of the private negotiations between North Vietnam and the Nixon administration for reparations for the release of MIA/POWs after the official "Homecoming" release in 1973. Clearly, the North Vietnamese saw the opportunity for economic aid directly related to the exchange of reparations for MIAs/POWs.

The United States was relieved to end the war and the population simply wanted to forget the existence of the war and any afterthought. Politicians were sensitive to the revulsion of the American people to offer of aid to Vietnam after it had treated our prisoners with such physical and mental abuse.

The families of MIAs and POWs simply did not have the political clout of voice to attract the attention of the American people or the Congress to demand the release of the prisoners.

The administration was in a dilemma as to how to force the Vietnamese government to repatriate U.S. servicemen after Congress had refused to follow through with an aid package which would result in the repatriation of MIAs/POWs. Further, the administration did not clearly identify "aid" as a requirement to the release prisoners. Hence MIAs/POWs continue to languish in Southeast Asia after being "abandoned" in 1973.

The anguish continues for the families as the United States government continues to deny the existence of American servicemen remaining in Asia. Subsequent administrations have found it more convenient to deny the existence of MIAs and POWs rather than open the question to the American people and admit the truth.