Missing an opportunity with Morocco, Western Sahara

The Obama administration has been very engaged in North Africa, from the president's 2009 Cairo speech to the policy of "leading from behind" during the Libyan Revolution of 2011. These efforts have had limited success, with some spectacular failures, but the region remains of great importance to the United States, given its geography and resources.

Surprisingly, given his stated preference for diplomacy over military intervention, President Obama has been less involved in the one challenge in northern Africa that has a path toward resolution, and could benefit from modest U.S. engagement: final status for Western Sahara.

Morocco, a steadfast U.S. ally that is also the most stable nation in North Africa, has encouraged our more energetic participation in these diplomatic efforts.

We should honor this request, appropriately re-engaging on this issue this year, the 15th anniversary of the reign of King Mohammed VI, a democratizing and modernizing constitutional monarch.

Western Sahara, occupied by Morocco, is a thinly populated desert region. Its population, just over 500,000, is Arabic-speaking, ethnically Berber, and known as "Sahrawis."

Until 1975-76, this was a Spanish colony, when Morocco took over two-thirds of the territory and Mauritania the remaining one third.

Mauritania proved unable to control its zone, and by 1979 Morocco had extended its authority to 85 percent of Western Sahara, which it still controls.

Even prior to the Spanish withdrawal, the Polisario Front, a Sahrawi movement for independence and socialism, had emerged and began violent attacks on Spanish forces, violence it continued against Morocco after Spain's withdrawal.

Since its formation, the Polisario has received significant support from Algeria, including weapons, funds and bases on its territory; indeed, without Algeria's aid, the Polisario would likely collapse within a few months.

There have been several attempts to resolve the question of final status.

A 1991 ceasefire between Morocco and the Polisario Front has mostly held in recent years, leaving the Polisario with 15 percent of Western Sahara, but demanding control over the rest. Initially, the UN attempted to hold a referendum on independence, but so badly botched the voter registration process that the vote never took place (although, in keeping with UN incompetence, the referendum office still exists, maintaining 200 personnel in Morocco, on a mission whose purpose has been overcome by events).

Since 2007, Morocco has offered a compromise, retaining sovereignty over Western Sahara, but with wide-ranging autonomy for the region. Under this plan, the Sahrawis would control their internal affairs, including policing to education, under a special status with their own legislature. Unfortunately, the Polisario Front has rejected this proposal, insisting on its maximal demand for independence.

The key here is that the Polisario, while formally claiming to be the voice of all Sahrawis, has become the wholly-owned subsidiary of Algeria.

It is not Sahrawis that necessarily reject the Moroccan proposal; instead, this rebuff has its origin with the regime in Algiers, which believes its interests lie in prolonging the conflict. Algeria, an authoritarian state dominated by military-linked elites, has been traditionally hostile to Morocco, refusing to foster real negotiations, despite its own Islamist insurgency.

The United States, without any investment of blood or treasure, could play a leading role in encouraging Algeria to change its policies.

While the U.S., as far back as the Clinton administration, has officially supported autonomy for Western Sahara, and bipartisan congressional majorities have also expressed this as U.S. policy, the Obama administration has done little to nudge Algeria, as it easily could.

Incredibly, despite rich agricultural land and proximity to Europe, the Algerian economy is more reliant on exports of oil and gas than even Saudi Arabia, earning 97 percent of its revenue from these sales.

Algeria could benefit from foreign investment, assistance with economic reforms, and better access to U.S. and European markets.

Backing in these areas, along with intelligence on the radical Islamists that continue to attack Algeria, could be useful inducements to prod a new perspective by the Algerians.

While the relationship with the U.S. has not always been friendly, the U.S. is Algeria's largest trading partner, and ties since 9/11 have improved, given the shared perspective on terrorism.

While Algeria may never feel warmth toward Morocco, its regional rival, it does share a concern about the ongoing threat of Al Qaeda in the Maghreb (Northwest Africa) and other terrorist movements, who are already attempting to recruit among the Polisario-run refugee camps. With a settlement in Western Sahara, these refugees could return to Morocco, and no longer be an audience with ready-to-exploit grievances.

Secretary of State Kerry did visit Morocco and Algeria in April 2014, and should follow up this visit with more engagement on the specific issue of Western Sahara, pointing out the benefits a resolution would bring to all.

His primary discussions with Algeria, focused on terrorism and trade, led to Algerian comments about "an emerging alliance."

Kerry's time in Morocco reinforced the long-standing alliance we share with the kingdom, but there is a window to do much more.

There is little downside risk to the U.S. for failure, but a real opportunity to resolve a conflict that not only can be ended, but on terms that benefit an entire region and the United States.

Wayne Bowen, a U.S. Army veteran, received his Ph.D. in history from Northwestern University. He resides in Cape Girardeau.