GATES NOMINATION SLOWLY BOILING IN AUGUST SUN

In another week dominated by Jeffrey Dahmer, the name Dewey Clarridge wasn't an immediate attention grabber. But for Robert Gates, the president's nominee for director of the CIA, Clarridge may be the final nail in the confirmation coffin.

Iran-Contra Special Prosecutor Lawrence Walsh has named Clarridge as a "target" of his investigation meaning, in more blunt terms, that Clarridge is about to be indicted for perjury.

In November 1985, Clarridge was chief of the CIA's Western Europe division. The first phase of the arms-for-hostage deal was then at a critical point. Admiral John Poindexter, President Ronald Reagan's national security adviser, had specifically authorized the transfer of 80 Hawk missiles to Iran in exchange for help in releasing American hostages. It was necessary for the missiles to be removed from one aircraft to another. Lisbon was picked as the transfer point. Colonel Oliver North, acting on behalf of Poindexter, instructed Clarridge to get Portuguese officials to approve the mysterious undertaking. Ultimately, the Portuguese government consented and the Hawks were transferred and flown to Iran.

When he testified before Congress, Clarridge denied knowing anything about missiles. He thought the material was "oil well drilling equipment." North disputed Clarridge in his recent grand jury testimony and other "fresh evidence" now confirms that Clarridge did have the knowledge he previously disclaimed.

Robert Gates was not deputy director of the CIA at the time, so the Lisbon transaction would not necessarily have been within his knowledge. Nonetheless, the more smoke that emits out of the CIA's expanding role in Iran-Contra, the more damage to Gates' nomination.

Also troubling to Gates is his shifting personal testimony before Congress when he was deputy director of the CIA in 1986 and 1987. Each time Gates testified he seemed to know just a little bit more. At the outset, he knew next to nothing, other than what he learned from the "public media." In subsequent hearings, Gates' knowledge improved by incremental bits and pieces. Those of us on the Senate Intelligence Committee who listened to Gates had the distinct impression that he went to great lengths to know as little as he could get away with. Intelligence officials make a career out of knowing things. Insofar as Iran-Contra was concerned, Gates operated on the promise that the less he knew, the better.

Finally, there is the burgeoning BCCI scandal and the CIA's knowledge of its illegal activities. In 1986, as Deputy Director, Gates sent a memo to the Treasury Department about the BCCI and, in transmitting it, verbally referred to BCCI as "the Bank of Crooks and Criminals International." What further did he do with his knowledge? Did he inform the Justice Department? Did the CIA itself use the bank? When?

The Gates nomination slowly boils in the August sun. Once again, the president may be faced with the job of escaping the political heat by transferring Gates to a position that does not require Senate confirmation. In a town like Washington that thrives on political dexterity, the president could nominate National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft to be director of the CIA and put Gates in Scowcroft's non-confirmable position. If the president wants to thumb his nose at Congress, he has this ready-made opportunity.