Report - Israeli intelligence on Iraq based on speculation

JERUSALEM -- A claim by Israeli intelligence that Iraq probably had weapons of mass destruction was based largely on speculation, not fact, parliamentary investigators said in a report Sunday. They dismissed suggestions that Israel tried to push its Western allies to war.

The report also faulted the intelligence agencies for failing to detect Libya's chemical and nuclear programs, calling the lapse "intolerable."

The 80-page document delivered a rare rebuke to the country's highly regarded intelligence community, which has taken pride in its ability to penetrate hostile countries. It also revealed the limitations of Israel's intelligence-gathering bodies, respected and feared around the world.

A warning light

"The lessons of the war in Iraq are a warning light that the intelligence estimates could be turned from a working instrument into a useless one, and that there is a danger that they could once again be revealed in the future to be standing on shaky ground," the report concluded.

The report capped an eight-month investigation launched after the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq a year ago. The six-member panel interviewed 70 witnesses, among them Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, his defense minister and the military chief.

Ahead of the March 2003 invasion, Israeli military leaders warned of Iraq's weapons capabilities, although they said the probability of an attack on Israel was low.

Nonetheless, they ordered citizens to ready gas masks and recommended that each home have a sealed room to protect against chemical attack -- strengthening the perception that Israeli intelligence had a clear picture of Iraq's non-conventional weapons capability.

Even as U.S. troops marched easily across Iraq, the army continued to warn that Saddam Hussein might fire missiles with chemical or biological warheads at Israel.

The precautions cost Israel many millions of dollars, but no missiles were fired at the country during the war. During the 1991 Gulf War, Iraq fired 39 missiles with conventional warheads at Israel, causing some damage but few casualties.

Sunday's report concluded that Israel had little concrete information about Iraq's chemical and biological weapons ahead of the invasion. Instead, intelligence agencies based their conclusions on assumptions and hearsay, the lawmakers found.

"Why didn't we succeed in laying down a broad and deep (intelligence) framework so we could rely on reports and not speculation and assumption? That is the central question," said lawmaker Yuval Steinitz of the governing Likud Party, who led the inquiry.

Despite the criticism, the report stressed that the intelligence agencies did not deliberately mislead Israeli officials or try to push the United States into war against Iraq, a longtime Israeli archenemy.

"We did not take the decision to go to war. We were not telling the Americans or the British, 'do this,' or 'don't do that,"' said Haim Ramon, a lawmaker from the opposition Labor Party who was on the committee.

The United States and Britain cited Iraq's development of weapons of mass destruction as reason for going to war. But since ousting Saddam, the coalition's technical experts have failed to find any such weapons, causing political problems for President Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair.

The criticism of the intelligence services, while rare, was somewhat muted. It did not fault anyone by name and provided a list of explanations for the intelligence breakdowns. They included the ease of hiding illegal weapons and Saddam's refusal to allow inspectors free access to suspected sites.

Ramon rejected such excuses.

During the investigation, he said intelligence officials failed to explain why they believed there was a high probability that Iraq has weapons of mass destruction. "I asked them and they didn't have an answer," Ramon said.

While initially focused on Iraq, the committee widened its probe when it became clear that Israel had been taken by surprise by Libya's arms program.

It noted that intelligence learned of the weapons programs only after Libya announced plans to disarm last December. The failure to detect Libya's non-conventional weapons program was "to say the least, intolerable," the report said.

The report offered a series of nonbinding recommendations. Among them: the appointment of a special intelligence adviser to the prime minister and shifting some of the military's intelligence duties to the Mossad spy agency.

The portion of the report released Sunday was the unclassified section of its study. A larger, secret report is still in preparation.